![]() It simplifies installers and helps avoid misconfiguration-the situation when the FIPS provider is not used in FIPS mode by accident becomes hardly possible.įIPS requires checksum validation of the certified modules. The original upstream solution required some explicit actions for this purpose, and we decided to avoid them. We’ve implemented auto-activation of the FIPS provider when the system is in FIPS mode. ![]() Relying on the new OpenSSL architecture, it retains the previous API signature. In OpenSSL 1.1, we had a macro named FIPS_mode for RHEL 8, so now we reimplement it for RHEL 9. Loading and configuring the providerįirst, applications may need to detect FIPS mode. And the rest bridge the significant differences between FIPS-140-2 and FIPS 140-3 requirements and match the selection of the features we certify. We also introduced FIPS indicators-a new concept of the FIPS 140-3 series of standards. Some simplify dealing with the FIPS provider for our purposes. There are three categories of FIPS-related patches. ![]() This also can be done via crypto policies. Unfortunately, we have to keep it for some legacy compatibility, but enabling it for digital signatures, both for signing and verification, now requires explicit setup by the end user. The algorithm can’t be considered secure enough in the face of modern computer security threats, so we disable support of SHA1 in signatures by default. We have a set of requirements and features not related to FIPS to make RHEL more robust, consistent and up-to-date from a security point of view.Ĭrypto policies have been present in our distributions since the RHEL 8.0 release and allow consistent enforcement of safe crypto algorithms for all the low-level crypto libraries, so we patch OpenSSL to support them.Īlso for RHEL 9, we’ve completed a system-wide project to stop using the SHA1 hash algorithm for digital signatures. Some of them are fixes for common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVEs) found after the release of the version we use. All in all, OpenSSL in RHEL 9.0 currently carries more than 60 patches. We also have our own patches related to hardening so our distributions follow up-to-date recommendations about algorithms and protocols. While we have to fix vulnerabilities and bugs, we avoid leaping to new major-or even minor-releases in the name of stability, backporting the most important fixes instead. The upstream was aiming for a FIPS 140-2 certification, but we needed the newer FIPS 140-3 certification with much stricter requirements. However, we came across a gap between the upstream solution and our productization requirements. Extracting the FIPS-certified code to a separate module instead of instrumenting both libcrypto and libssl also significantly reduces maintenance efforts. ![]() The provider that we were particularly interested in was the one implementing Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) algorithms and limitations. One of the anticipated changes in OpenSSL 3.0 was the new provider model. This decision was made to significantly reduce our maintenance burden during the 10+ years of RHEL 9 support. Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9.0 and OpenSSL 3.0ĭuring the development of Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) 9, we decided to switch to OpenSSL 3.0 even though we were not sure that it would be finalized early enough. ![]()
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